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Secularization in
Orleans, France
A Case Study Utilizing Mark Chaves' "New
Differentiation Theory"
Stephanie Beck
April15, 2011

Steeped in a heavily religious history, Europe and specifically France provide an intriguing
backdrop for a closer look into secularization in present-day Orleans, France. Many various
approaches to secularization theory have arisen over the past sixty years. This paper explores
the evolution of secularization theory, delving into Mark Chaves' " New Differentiation Theory",
based upon religious authority's influence on t he individual, societal, and institutional levels.
Though created by an American academician, the " New Differentiation Theory'' provides a new
basis of analysis with which one may draw conclusions regarding the state of secularization in a
European city (in this case Orleans, France). Beginning with the broader European context then
moving toward the specific case in Orleans, t his paper analyzes historical facts and personal
interview data from 100 French in Orleans in light of Chaves' categorical approach . This paper
utilizes Chaves' secularization theory in order to investigate the interesting trends of religious
authority' s influence in Orleans, France, thus providing valuable data and analyses for future
research in the field of secu larization theory and religion .
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A H ISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EUROPE

There are very few who would disagree that a dramatic change has taken place in the
religious environment of Europe as history has progressed from its roots in Christianity to its
present state. Grace Davies in her book Europe: the Exceptional Case reveals such a change. She
recounts a specific event that happened in 2000 at the Gallery of London. Davies describes an
exhibition entitled 'Seeing Salvation' which depicted the story of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.
Davies emphasizes that, despite its "unashamedly Christian" message, the exhibition was
incredibly popular and attracted extraordinary numbers. A correspondence to the Director of the
gallery congratulated the Director on his courage in displaying an exhibition with such an
explicitly Christian theme. In contrast, a different situation occurred when the city added a bust
of John Calvin in a heavily frequented location in Orleans, France. A Lutheran pastor with whom
I spoke described the event saying news correspondents were outraged that the city would allow
the explicit display of a religious figure in such a public setting. How Europe has transformed
into a society so dramatically disconnected from its Christian roots is at the base of many
historians' and sociologists' research. Looking back into historical examples of limited religious
tolerance, emphasis of intellect over belief, skepticism of religion, and separation of church and
state, one can see some of the complexities involved in the evolution of Christianity in Europe.
Limited tolerance in Europe arose in the wake of the Reformation. After the signing of
the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, Europe was divided into the Roman Catholic Church and the
Lutheran (Protestant) Church. Though the common principle had been to follow the rel igion of
the king, several German cities allowed Catholics and Protestants to have equal rights. During
the second half of the sixteenth century during the French Religious Wars, a pofitique party arose
3

which believed that imposing religious orthodoxy threatened peace. Though the French
Religious War ended with a Catholic victory, the Edict of Nantes of 1598 permitted partial
tolerance for Protestants. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended many years of religious war in
Europe. Though these cases showed the beginnings of tolerance, the Protestant minority's rights
were gradually taken away, even completely in France after the Revocation of the Edict of
Nantes in 1685. In other areas of Europe, tolerance arose out of practicality. After a long war
with Spain, the population of the Dutch Republic belonged to various religious communities.
Civil war in England during the 1640s and 1650s also created much religious diversity. In these
cases, one state religion would not have been pragmatic (McLeod 5-6). Even as tolerance
expanded during seventeenth century Europe, it remained limited.
The eighteenth century Enlightenment saw the spread and growth of intellectual pursuits.
The Enlightenment was an international movement that found its locus in the cultural capitalParis, France. Most of the philosophers were French. Enlightenment philosophers, called

philosophes, such as Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu and Adam Smith, presented
new ways to view government and socio-political interactions. Montesquieu's works along with
those of the late eighteenth century deist, Fran9ois-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, attacked
traditional religion. Voltaire, like many of the philosophes of the time, was a deist. In denying
God's direct involvement in the world, deists further rejected religious authority. Some,
however, completely rejected God. Denis Diderot and Paul d'Holbach were adversely opposed to
any notion of God's existence, uncompromisingly retaining atheist views. Even the debate about
women came into question. Before, men were considered to be superior to women. Yet with the
onset of the Enlightenment, individuals such as Mary Wollstonecraft, an eighteenth-century
advocate of women's rights, challenged those notions. Although racism was still present,
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Enlightenment thinkers ventured to propose rights to Jews and Muslims, the most despised
religious minorities of Europe. Society's mindsets began changing concerning many different
areas of life. Overall, reliance upon intellect gained a strong foothold in European thought
(McLeod 5-7).
While the Reformation had attempted to solidify religious sentiments, the opposite
reaction occurred as people became disenchanted by religion. Europeans began questioning their
beliefs and turning away from religion as they saw it to be strict, controlling, and intolerant.
During the late seventeenth century, John Locke proposed that all humans were born tabula rasa,
with a blank mind. Humans are thus created by their experiences and surround ings. This idea
coupled with Isaac Newton's natural laws established a foundation based upon reason and
intellect. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also asserted that children should be left to follow their natural
instincts and emphasized the importance of a balance between the heart and mind. This belief
would be foundational to the Romanticism that arose in the nineteenth century (Spielvogel).
Thus, the rise of tolerance and the Enlightenment gave birth to skepticism. This
skepticism was tolerated in some countries like England and the Dutch Republic, but in other
places like the strongly orthodox Catholic France, deism arose more discreetly. Yet by the
second half of the eighteenth century, deism and even atheism, though not as favored, became
viable religious options for men of the aristocracy and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Looking at
evidence from France and Germany, it appears that religious observation began to greatly decline
around this period. Around 1750 in France, recruitment to the priesthood and to religious orders
was declining (McLeod 7). It is important to note that there are some sociologists who, rather
than considering this a decline of Christendom, view the trend as a movement toward a different
5

mindset regarding Christianity. In other words, while Europe was movmg away from
Christendom, it was not necessarily undermining Christianity. Even though established churches
were heavily attacked by antireligious intellectuals, Christianity still thrived. Religious devotion
remained strong. John Wesley founded Methodism, representing a key revival of Christianity. It
is also important to note that there were periods of revival within Christianity such as the Great
Awakening. Between 1830 and 1960 still a sizable number of people within rural communities
still practiced Christianity. The positive response to Billy Graham's 1950s Evangelistic Crusades
is another testament to the durability of Christianity despite the apparent downward trend.
Skepticism greatly increased in Europe, but Christianity did not die.
Whereas the church and state had strong ties in the past, European leaders began looking
to the separation of church and state. In the late eighteenth century, laws of separation of church
and state were enacted in France (1795) and in the Netherlands (1796). Even though Napoleon's
defeat in 1815 meant that the church and state would be under the same control once again, this
formal relationship between church and state became less significant again in the latter part of
the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Ireland (1869), France (1905), Geneva ( 1907), and
Wales (1931) (McLeod 8-9). This trend affected education. Education became more and more
secularized as schools introduced a wider range of philosophies to students and, in some schools,
removed the requirement to attend mass. This separation of church and state most recently
occurred in Sweden (2000), but there are other countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and
England where a formal separation has not yet taken place. Even though the separation of church
and state resulted from some violent cases as seen in the French Revolution and the Spanish
Civil War of 1936-9, Hugh McLeod in The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-

2000 asserts that the general tendency has been a gradual movement away from Christendom.
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THE EVOLUTI ON OF SECULARI ZATION THEORY

Taking history into account, sociologists and historians alike have created theories about
this move away from Christianity and from religious belief in general. Since the mid-twentieth
century, sociologists and historians have studied this idea of secularization in the effort to
discover and present some sort of clarity to this trend. However, multiple theories have arisen
and transformed as the centuries progressed, resulting in what some sociologists would describe
as an end to secularization theory itself.
THE ROOTS OF "SECULARIZATION"

It is necessary to begin with a look at the etymology of "secularization". According to

Swatos the word "secularization" comes from the Latin saeculum, meaning "an age (or era) but
also, at least by the fourth and fifth centuries, ' the world,"' (Secularization). Monastic priests
were distinguished from secular clergy in the sense that secular clergy went out into the world to
serve the people rather than "stay under a formal "rule of life" ... but it was also used to mean a
life or life-style that is at odds with God. Thus people would enter monastic life to flee "the
world". Later the term made a distinction between civil and ecclesiastical law, lands, and
possessions" (Swatos). In the Germanic Empire during the Protestant Revolution, the civil state
practiced secu larized policies by distributing ecclesiastical property. During the French
Revolution there was the "nationalization and sale of the property of the Catholic Church as
"national goods" (Bauberot 452). In more ecclesiastical terms, "secular" referred to a cleric in
the Catholic Church who lived outside the "siecle" in the "secular state", or " life in the world"
thus distinguishing " regular priests", or monks, from "secular priests", who led the parishioners.
Later during the nineteenth century, the British freethinker G.J. Holyoake would adopt the term
7

to create the Secular Society, a group dedicated to a just and moral order that would address
human problems without the inclusion of supernatural explanations. This term already assumed
some "ambiguous, but increasingly negative, use by the time it was adapted into social science"
(Swatos).
KEY CONTRIBUTORS TO SECULARIZATION THEORY

Sociologists began exploring the link between modernity and the decline of religion in
the 1950s and 60s (Berger, Faith 69). Emile Durkheim and Max Weber were the first to really
begin exploring secularization theory. Max Weber began the idea of secularization during the
early to mid-1900s. Weber's view of religion was " more substantively conceptualized as bodies
of beliefs and practices concerning salvation" (Chaves 750). The religious point of view,
according to Weber, is in a state of competition against other claims which are all competing for
authority. He also believed that the development of Protestantism had created a sense of
disillusionment since Protestantism "reject[ed] magic means of achieving salvation like so many
superstitions and sacrileges" for carrying out religious principles (Bauberot 453). Furthermore,
the rise of industrial capitalism, according to Weber, necessarily drew people away from religion
since "industrial production develops on a mechanical basis, favoring an instrumental
rationality" (Bauberot 451 ). Peter L. Berger, another secularization theorist, asserts that, "ever
since the Enlightenment, intellectuals of every stripe have believed that the inevitable
consequence of modernity is the decline of religion" (Berger, Secularization). He cites
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, prominent thinkers who believed that the progress of science and
rationality was an inevitable replacement of religiosity, seeing religion as an "opiate" or an
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"illusion" (Berger, Secularization 23). These VIews created more reasons to explore
secularization theory.
As this topic expanded, several sociologists formulated their own set of views concerning
secularization theory. Instead of religious competition, Larry Shiner in 1967 looked at the change
in society's view of traditions.

Shiner defined secularization as the decline of religion. He

related this concept to the decline of "prestige and influence" of religion's "previously accepted
symbols, doctrines, and institutions." It is important to note that Shiner viewed secularization
theory with much reservation because of the confusion that arose from the term "secularization"
(Swatos). Yet Shiner nonetheless contributed to secularization discussions.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Bryan Wilson picked up this discussion and asserted that society
experiences secularization when there is: "( 1) a decrease in the portion of wealth devoted to the
"supernatural"; (2) an increased independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the
idea that social practices change living conditions; and (3) an increasing justification of
institutions functioning with little or no tie to religion" (Bauberot 453). Wilson claimed that
modernization and secularization go hand in hand and "insisted that secularization refers to a
process by which religion loses its social significance ... a process by which it 'has lost its
presidency over other institutions" (Chaves 752). Wilson maintained a distinct difference
between considering religion's influence and " the mere existence of religious beliefs and
sentiments among individuals" (Chaves 752). According to Wilson, secularization is "the
process by which religion loses social significance" (McLeod 14). He then connected this
occurrence to modern societies, highlighting different societal aspects that have promoted
secularization. Wilson insisted that it is the "system that becomes secularized" (Chaves 753). So
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in this sense, the substantial "action" associated with secularization is at the societal level more
so than at the personal, internal belief level. This distinction will become more important as one
explores Mark Chaves' secularization theory later in the paper.
Sociologist Karel Dobbelaere's ( 198 1) view of secularization also bears some weight in
secularization theory. Like Wilson, Dobbelaerc presented secularization from the societal-level
standpoint. He pays special attention to secularization as a societal-level process, "driven by
functional differentiation, to which religious organizations and individuals react." Later in 1991,
Frank J. Lechner asserts the same argument: "secularization theory ... as a theory of societal
change does not primarily address religious behavior of individuals at all." Thus, all individuallevel experiences are considered irrelevant within the context of secularization theory.
In 1994, Mark Chaves drew heavily from Weber's sociology of religion to formulate his
definition of secularization as the declining scope of religious authority (Chaves 753-4). Chaves'
theory is similar to Wilson's theory in that he refers to religious authority's influence on different
parts of society. We will go into greater detail about Chaves' theory later in the paper. Soon after
in 1995, Steve Bruce wrote Religion in the Modern World. He claimed that individualism was
leading many to pick a religion based upon personal preferences, thus equalizing the religious
market. Specialized positions within the church have arisen, which has decreased the functions
of clergy and other church leaders. Connecting the increase of state power, as seen in growing
corporations and bureaucracies, with the decrease of religion, Bruce argues that religion
burgeons in smaller communities where personal, "face-to-face" contact is essential (McLeod
14). This overview of the evolution of secularization theory is not exhaustive. However, these
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views set the foundation for the way present-day sociologists and historians view secularization
theory.
CRITIQUEING SECULARIZATION THEORY: THE ISSUE WITH "RELIGION"

Even though secularization theory progressed with much interest, some doubt
secularization's legitimacy. One of the biggest issues involves the questions surrounding the
term "religion". A couple of questions that inevitably arise within this discussion are ' What is
religion?' and ' How does one analyze religion in terms of secularization theory?' It is wellknown that Weber himself never defined "religion". Durkheim ostensibly formulated a definition
of religion, but this definition was "refabricated" by Talcott Parson, an American sociologist
who served on Harvard's faculty from 1927-73. According to Parson, "religion unites all who
adhere to it into a single moral community. Religion was the glue of society, the source of social
solidarity" (Swatos). However, this definition did not stand when applied to pluralistic societies
like the United States (Swatos). When C. Wright Mills summarized Parson's theory, he stated
that there was a dramatic shift after the Reformation and the Renaissance when the "forces of
modernization swept across the globe and secularization ... [and] loosened the dominance of the
sacred." Parson believed that the "sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the
private realm" (Swatos). In other words, Parson believed that the rise of modernization would
inevitably result in the disappearance of religion in society except that which one practices at
home. However, Parson made this assumption with no historical evidence. Swatos asserts that
one is incapable of analyzing religion because of its variable nature. Religion, according to
Swatos, is therefore non-empirical and an "uncontrollable" referent. Furthermore, if one states
that people are less religious now than they were a hundred years ago, one gets into the trap of
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presuming to know how religious people lived a hundred years ago (Swatos). One could say that
analyzing how religious people live today is possible, but then one still deals with this question
of who is truly religious and who is not and upon what is this based? So we come fu ll circle and
see the difficulties in addressing secularization theory in terms of this complicated and
oftentimes vague word, " religion".
Because of the issues surrounding the term "religion," many sociologists have changed
their terminology or altered their view of secularization. Callum Brown observes that some
sociologists have changed their terminology from religious ' decline' to religious 'change',
acknowledging the complexities surrounding the term "religion" when discussing secularization.
Others understand secularization in a purely historical sense, viewing the changes as historical
development.

In light of this, Brown presented his own definition of secularization:

"' Secularization' represents a number of different things to scholars. First, it is a theory which,
broadly speaking, defines the decline in the social significance of religion as a long-term and
inevitable historical process, with short-term accelerants (such as the Reformation, the
Enlightenment, industrialization and urbanization) and also short-term retardants (generally
referred to as ' revivals ')" (McLeod 37). There are various perspectives addressing religion and
secularization. What is clear is that one should not ignore this term but seriously consider how
one should approach secularization in light of the differing views of religion.
CHAVES' NEW DIFFERENTIATION THEORY: A NEW APPROACH

Since one of the biggest areas of tension relates to questions surround ing religion, one of
the leading researchers of religion and sociology, Mark Chaves, has formulated his own theory.
Chaves is currently a Notre Dame University researcher and has written such works as
12

Continuity and Change in American Religion (2011), Congregations in America (2004), and
Ordaining Women: Culture and Conflict in Religious Organizations (1997). He has also written
countless articles and chapters concerning sociology and religion and was the winner of the 2006
Distinguished Book Award from the American Sociological Association ' s Sociology of Religion
Section. Chaves enters into this discussion of secularization theory by raising some legitimate
questions: "Does the persistence of religion falsify secularization theory? Or does the form of
religion's persistence render its persistence irrelevant to, or even supportive of, secularization
theory?" (Chaves 750). This section of the paper will take a closer look at Chaves' "New
Differentiation Theory" and what makes it a good choice for secularization research in Europe.
In order to address some of the complexities of religion, Chaves takes a different
approach. Unlike other sociologists and historians, Chaves has not given up on secularization
theory as a legitimate source of further debate or study. He asserts that one should evaluate what
should be kept or abandoned. Chaves argues that one should not simply throw out secularization
theory, but rather rethink and reformulate it. Regarding secularization, many say that a country
or region is secularized when it becomes less religious, or because religion is in decline in that
country or region. It is one thing to say that religion is in decline, but defining what that means is
complicated because defining "religion" itself is a complex process. This would inevitably lead
to a discussion concerning belief which becomes even more convoluted. However, if one shifts
the discussion to observations concerning individual religious practices, changes within religious
institutions, and religious institutions' interactions with other spheres of society, one gets closer
to Chaves' position.
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With an empirical focus in mind, Chaves seeks to reconceptualize the object of
secularization through what he calls his "New Differentiation Theory". It is "new" in the sense
that secularization has not been studied before in quite this way; "differentiation" refers to
Chaves ' categories and the way he focuses on religious authority's influence on other spheres of
society; and "theory" to refer to his specific research seeking to analyze secularization in the
world. First of all, Chaves defines secularization as the declining scope of religious authority. So
rather than making a broad statement about the decline or increase in religion itself, Chaves
looks at how religious authority influences spheres of society. He expands upon this idea of
different spheres by validating his research based upon recent studies, secularization literature,
what he calls "Weberian insight", and his claim to be more empirically founded in research
technique.
Like other analysts of religion, Chaves establishes that numerous institutional spheres are
different from religion. Here Chaves establishes religion as one sphere among many. But the
question still remains, how is religion to be understood? How should one understand this
religious sphere? Chaves claims that religion is "one relativized sphere among other relativized
spheres, whose elites jockey to increase or at least maintain their control over human actions,
organizational resources, and other societal spheres" (Chaves 752). However, the idea of ' elite
influence' is a highly theoretical concept. In religion there are leaders or " elites" who exercise a
certain level of influence within the religious sphere, such as pastors, priests, teachers, etc. It is
difficult to clearly identify who these elites are and what level of influence they exert within a
religious sphere. Based on Chaves' information, I believe that he defines neither religion nor
religious elites. He clearly desires that the focus be on the ends rather than the means within
these three areas- social, institutional, and individual.
14

Other secularization theorists have presented theories that emphasize a societal view of
secularization. Bryan Wilson asserts that secularization "does not even suggest that most
individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even though that may be the case"
(Chaves 752). Chaves agrees with this notion that separates religion's effect from the existence
of religious beliefs (752). Wilson asserts that it is "the system" that becomes secularized rather
than the individual. With this insistence on "the system," Wilson emphasizes societal
secularization. Though Wilson has good insights, his perspective, according to Chaves, makes it
difficult to "conceptualize the ways in which secularization is and is not manifested at the
individual level of analysis" (753). Remember, Chaves seeks to address all levels of analysis, not
just societal. Frank J. Lechner and Karel Dobbelaere present societal-level processes of
secularization. Once again Chaves appreciates some of their ideas, but he still pushes for a multilevel approach to secularization theory.
Since Chaves' theory is quite different from many other approaches, it is necessary to
understand "reli gious authority". Chaves looks at what he calls a Weberian approach to religious
authority. As stated earlier, Weber himself never defined religion, but he did allude to religious
authority by defining "religious organization". Weber defined a "hierocratic organization" as "an
organization which enforces its order through psychic coercion by distributing or denying
religious benefits ... A compulsory hierocratic organization will be called a "church" insofar as
its administrative staff claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion" (Chaves
754). In this, it is clear that Weber is thinking in political terms. But there are areas where
Weber's analogy of political authority breaks down when speaking about religious authority. We
can legitimately say that, to an extent, political authority rests upon the "threatened use of
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physical coercion" to gain complacence, but "psychic coercion" does not work in the same way.
It is very difficult even impossible to explain the how's and why's of psychic coercion.

Instead Chaves asserts that a " religious authority structure... [is] a social structure that
attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some
desired goods, where the legitimation of that control includes some supernatural component"
(755-6). By "authority," Chaves means that which is "legitimated by calling on some
supernatural referent" (756). This religious authority could refer to a god, multiple gods, or
spirits, but it could also refer to the language employed by adherents or leaders so long as that
language refers to the supernatural. One cannot define what those desired goods are since that
depends upon the religion. Chaves claims:
The "goods" to which a religious authority structure controls access might be deliverance
from sickness, meaninglessness, poverty, desire, sin, or other undesirable conditions. Or,
religious authority might offer a positive good such as eternal life, nirvana, utopian
community, perfect health, great wealth, or other valued states... The point here is that
"religious goods" can be otherworldly or this-worldy, general or specific, psychic or
material, collective or individual. .. [Thus] secularization as declining religious authority,
then, will refer to the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on
reference to the supernatural. (756)

In other words, a social structure legitimates its control by referring to the supernatural through
the use of religious goods.
Chaves shifts to the scope of religious authority. He separates the scope into three
categories: societal, institutional, and individual. First, societal secularization refers to the extent
16

to which religious authority is able to influence non-religious institutional spheres. Chaves states
that "secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity of religious
elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres" (757). This could be religious
authority's significance in political decisions or even in public works projects.
Institutional secularization is harder to conceptualize. Chaves states that "secularization
at the organizational [or institutional] level may be understood as religious authority's declining
control over the organizational resources within the religious sphere" (757). Some assert that
institutional secularization arises when religious organizations allow the secular world to
influence internal affairs. This may be in the form of "adaptation" or "accommodation" to the
secular world, or a "lack of depth" motivating religious activity (Chaves 766). However, Chaves
asks, "But how, exactly, does one tell the difference between a sacred and a secular value?
Between a religious and a secular activity? By what criteria are the current practices of religious
organizations more secular than past practices?" (766). Chaves uses examples to explain
organizational secularization. One can see organizational, or institutional, secularization in a
Belgium Catholic school where the number of lay relative to religious professionals on the
teaching staff is higher. Another example is in increasing numbers of denominational CEO's
with predominantly non-religious career backgrounds versus those who have had solely religious
career backgrounds. These examples shed some light upon Chaves' theory as it relates to
institutional secularization.
In regard to individual-level secularization, the question does not involve belief, but
rather refers to the "extent to which individual actions are subject to religious control," or the
"extent to which [individual] actions are regulated by religious authority" (Chaves 757, 768).
Chaves' examples of individual-level secularization include religious authority' s influence over
17

reproductive behavior, voting, diet, religious intermarriage, etc. Overall, Chaves emphasizes
analysis based upon empirical, objective data.
In order to demonstrate the relationship between these levels, Chaves charts out his
observations concerning societies and secularization at the societal and individual levels (refer to
table at the bottom of the page). He observes that areas where institutions like education and
science are influenced by religious authority reflect a low secularization at the societal level.
This could happen historically as in traditional societies or "because a differentiated religious
authority has managed to exert (or reexert) control over the other spheres as in medieval Europe
or contemporary Iran" (Chaves 760). In contrast, more secularized societies are those places
where religious authority tends to have a weaker influence on areas the state, the arts, the
economy, etc. Similarly, the
less
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"the nature of the relationship between religion and social movements." So one could say that
areas with high levels of societal and individual secularization utilize religion as a "cultural
resource for social movements" (Chaves 761 ). In other words, one may use religious symbols
and themes to increase public support of a social movement, but religious organizations and
leaders will not play a significant role.
CHA YES SECULARIZATION MODEL AND EUROPE

Chaves is an American sociologist, so many of his examples of secularization stem from
America. However, this study proposes that one can use Chaves' theory to analyze secularization
in Europe. Referring back to the European history previously covered, it will be argued how,
according to Chaves' model of societal, institutional, and individual-level secularization, Europe
has experienced secularization on all three levels.
CHAVES' THEORY AND EUROPE

There are examples of societal secularization in European history. One of the major
examples is the rise of tolerance, though limited, between Catholics and Protestants. After the
Reformation and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the Roman Catholic Church had lost some of
its political authority to the Lutherans. Before the rise of tolerance, allegiance to either
Catholicism or Protestantism was incredibly important and had caused numerous conflicts for
many years. After the rise of tolerance, individuals began to break away from established
tradition and belief that related to the religion of the king- a Catholic king obligated you to
Catholicism; a Protestant king to Protestantism. Tolerance served to break religious authority of
their political influence. Being Protestant was no longer illegal. Whether true religious freedom
arose out of this tolerance or not, establishing nation-wide tolerance led to the reduction of
19

religious authority's influence since the religious sphere no longer dictated a society's
denominational preference.
The most salient examples of societal secularization in Europe were separation of religion
from state and from education. The separation of church and state began in the eighteenth
century and continued through the twenty-first century in countries such as France, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Wales. Currently, many Europeans countries have
established some form of separation between church and state, though this separation may
remain partial. Though some church-state connections still exist in selected countries, those ties
have gradually loosened. This serves as one of the clearest examples of secularization at the
societal level because two very distinct spheres, religion and politics, become mutually exclusive
concerning the scope of authority. In other words, one sphere will not absolutely impose its
values and views, its authority, on the other. The introduction of a secular educational system
also signifies societal secularization. Whereas religious education was obligatory at one point,
religious authority again lost its influence upon yet another important area of society.
One can see examples of institutional secularization in events not previously described,
namely the secularization of schools. Since Chaves does not make institutional secularization
very clear outside of the examples he provides, one can cite the transformation of the University
of the Sorbonne in Paris, France as an example of institutional secularization. At its start in the
thirteenth century, the Sorbonne primarily taught theology. Taught under the same professor, the
discipline of the Catholic Church was not taught separately from theology. Theology lost its
major role in the university, allowing institutions in the Arts and Sciences to gain priority. Since
Chaves cites the growing number of non-religious teachers in religiously affiliated schools as an
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example of institutional secularization, the divergence from religious foundations proves to be an
example of institutional secularization as is the case with the Sorbonne.
Besides this example, one could also consider the implementation of limited tolerance as
an example of institutional secularization. After the Peace of Augsburg, churches were required
to legitimate Protestantism. Catholic authorities had to allow the people to choose Protestantism
if they so desired. Their authority was necessarily weakened since they had influence over an
increasingly smaller number of people as citizens chose to go to Protestant churches. The Treaty
of Westphalia ended the religious wars in Europe in 1648. As stated earlier, some churches
allowed tolerance out of practicality. In this situation, pragmatism grew stronger than the
church's authority to keep the community under one sole religion. The changes that took place
after the Reformation inevitably transformed the way church leadership, especially Catholic
leadership, addressed religion within their own institution. Though this second example seems to
fit Chaves' secularization theory, it is not completely clear. Therefore, one observes minimal
secularization at the institutional level according to Chaves' theory and the available historical
evidence.
After the Enlightenment, intellectual pursuits led to secularization in the individual
sphere. Though few in number, the philosophies of the Enlightenment were far-reaching. By
emphasizing the individual pursuit of knowledge, religious influence on individuals decreased in
intensity. No other evidence so strongly supports the growth of this secularization at the
individual level than the complete rejection of religion and belief. As more members of society
questioned their beliefs, even turning to other belief systems such as deism, Locke's tabula rasa
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philosophy, and skepticism, society became more secularized. Some historians refer to this
period as the pivotal point in Europe's trend toward secularization (McLeod 6-7).
In addition, church attendance and the divergence from one religion to another points to
individualized secularization. During the late 1800's, a decrease in church attendance was
common to most parts of Europe, especially among the working class men and peasantry
(McLeod 13). While it is agreed that this does not necessarily signal the decline of religion, the
power of religious influence upon the individual and his or her quotidian decisions did not
change this trend. It appears reasonable to argue that even the divergence from the traditional
norms of belief seem to signal a certain degree of individual secularization. Many historians and
sociologists postulate that many simply chose a different religion or belief system. One could
argue that secularization is evident in this case since the religious influence upon the individual
proved insufficient to keep him or her from changing belief systems.
Having surveyed the history of Europe and how Chaves' secularization model applies to
it, I logically conclude that, where societal and institutional secularization began, individual
secularization inevitably followed. In Europe this conclusion appears plausible since religious
authority greatly revolved around the church's influence in political issues. For example, Kings,
such as Louis XIV and James I of England, led because they were given the divine or God-given
right to do so. Church leaders were deemed to be the only legitimate authorities on Scriptures,
thus leading to a great reliance upon popes and priests, even if such religious authorities were
corrupt. So in the sixteenth century when citizens doubted kings as rulers by divine right and
when Christians no longer solely relied upon scriptural interpretation by religious leaders thanks
to Martin Luther, the scope of religious authority on the individual inevitably declined. This
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trend away from the traditional norm in European Christianity surfaces as a key to the whole
secularization debate.
One might question the notion of secularization in Europe by referring to periods of
religious revival (John Wesley and the Methodist Church, Billy Graham's Evangelistic Crusades,
for example). However, these phases were momentary or short-lived (McLeod 37). On the
whole, one can conclude that Europe has been secularized since, according to Chaves' model,
there is proof in all three levels of analysis. However, more evidence exists for secularization in
the societal and individual spheres. Chaves' definition of institutional secularization is somewhat
vague. Therefore, Europe fits Chaves' New Differentiation Theory, though with some
reservation due to the lack of numerous historical examples in support of institutional
secularization.
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FRANCE

Before taking a closer look at the city of interest for this study, namely Orleans, it is
necessary to explore the historical background of the country in which it is situated- France.
The eighteenth century Enlightenment found its focal point in burgeoning Paris, France.
Philosophers during this time encouraged an increasing independence of social conduct. They
emphasized two " hopes": the first hope lay in the relationship between a better condition oflife
and the direction of progress; the second hope lay in the connection between technical progress
and " increased satisfaction of the needs of humanity and the advancement of well-being; moral
progress that lessens the violence in human relationships and leads to a harmonious coexistence;
political progress permitting the gradual, historical realization of freedom, equality, and justice"
(456). Even though society's gaze seemed fixed upon a societal ideal that seemed bent upon
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peace and universal prosperity, the French quickly found themselves amid turmoil and
revolution.
In the wake of the Enlightenment's utopian ideals grew an ever-growing tension that
would affect the outcome of French society for generations to come. In 1766, the French
governmental system was based upon absolute monarchy. Louis XV revealed the mindset behind
absolute monarchy: 'Sovereign power resides in my person alone. To me alone belongs all
legislative power with neither any responsibility to others nor any division of that power. Public
order in all its entirety emanates from me, and the rights and interests of the nation are
necessarily bound up with my own and rest only in my hands' (Price 82-3). And, as the clergy
continuously asserted, this was God 's will. Despite their claim to divine appointment, many
rulers would not be able to hold society's loyalty for long.
Louis XVI considerably weakened the absolutist image with his inability to choose a
successful chief minister. This weakness seemed to contradict his divine right to rule. His
decision to isolate himself from the populace only undermined his authority. In 1786, the
Controller General Colonne warned Louis XVI of a financial crisis. In order to raise support for
the measures he suggested, Colonne called upon an Assembly of Notables whose 144 members
"would be selected by the king from amongst 'people of weight, worthy of the public's
confidence and such that their approbation would powerfully influence general opinion'" (Price
86). Colonne came under much criticism, so he was replaced by Lomenie de Brienne,
Archbishop of Toulouse, whose endeavors experienced no greater success. Brienne called upon
Parliament for support but its members would not back tax increases without calling upon an
Estates-General. A date was set for an Estates-General, but Brienne's failures led to a new
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ministry under the direction of Necker. By this time, the reputation of the monarchical system
was completely disgraced.
Destitution, riots, and disorder mounted as the country neared revolution. Poor cereal
harvests hurt the economy which was already in shambles as some greatly prospered at the
expense of the majority. The government's inability to effectively deal with the rising fiscal
problems severely reduced its credibility. This failure also increased opposition and the drive
toward constitutional reform. This was the tumultuous backdrop of the Third Estate issue. The
Third Estate called for equal status among clergy and nobility. This Jed to the circulation of

cahiers de doleances, pamphlets that presented and debated the political reforms each social
group desired. In the end, there was a predominant sense of agreement between the desires of the
three estates. The royal government's inability to effectively respond to the three estates' appeals
increased revolutionary sentiment.
During these turbulent years, a modern political culture was created and widely
circulated, transferring sovereignty from the king to the nation (Price 79). Poor leadership and
bad political decisions continued to disintegrate the people's confidence in the government.
Public tension erupted. Rioting groups burned internal customs posts and searched for arms
through an attack upon the Bastille in Paris. "Solid middle-class citizens" established the
' Permanent Committee' in order to take the place of a royal municipality and "to create a
citizens' militia to preserve order and protect the city against attack." A " new political culture"
had been created through such actions as the establishment of the Declaration of the Right of
Man and the Citizen (Price 100; 105-6).
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Many viewed the Revolution and its transfer of sovereignty from king to nation as a
nonreligious movement. Yet some historians believe that the Declaration of the Right of Man
and the Citizen led to a notion of creating a " new man," that the Revolution and all its ideals
would somehow "regenerate the human being" (Bauberot 460). This Declaration and the
Revolution itself sought nonreligious values and was even seen as a direct refusal of
Catholicism. Yet some historians believe that, in rejecting the Catholic Church, this French
republicanism created a "secular religion" (Bauberot 460).
If there was any hope in this new governrnent, it was clouded by the counterrevolutionary
threat which incited radicalism. This radicalism made it very difficult to instate new leadership
within the new government. In 1789, the Assembly began taking active steps to reorganize the
Church. The Declaration of Rights had established a precedent for the freedom of worship, so the
Catholic clergy felt their autonomy threatened. The papacy objected to the democratization of the
Church. Further objection to the Revolution arose when the community's right to have a parish
priest was threatened. Violence ensued as the struggle for power led to conflict between the
politically opposing Montagnards (the radicals) and the Girondins. Then the Reign of Terror
arose, adding more turmoil and chaos to the already tumultuous political environment of France
(Price 120).
According to Price, the Terror led to a campaign of dechristianisation in some areas in
1793. A new calendar abolished Sunday. This reflected the anti-religious sentiments and anticlericalism which led to a "new revolutionary cult of Reason and the Supreme Being" (Price
120). The Catholic Church has historically had a great impact upon France. One of the main
issues that arose in French society dealt with "clericalism," or, according to Bauberot, "the claim
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of religion to political dominion over the country" (459). However, anticlericalism arose when
the Church began to have an abusively dominant influence upon political affairs. They saw the
Jesuits impact upon the youth as too intrusive. From anticlericalism, individuals began
questioning the Church institution itself and started moving toward a "free religiosity," or "a
personal devotion where the relationship with the Divine supersedes ecclesiastical structures"
(Bauberot 460). Later on, Victor Hugo would be one of the great advocates of this "free
religiosity." The growing reliance upon scientific ideology also led to an anticlericalism that
"perceived religion as an outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards
orientation, irrelevant to the context of modem democracies" (Bauberot 460). Though, one must
note, that these radical measures against the Church also led to strengthened support of
traditional religious customs in other areas.
A conservative First Republic arose but its politicians led to its own downfall. In 1799,
the Consul was established after a coup d' etat that was led mainly under the authority of
Napoleon Bonaparte. After much military and political success, he was appointed consul for
life. He later crowned himself Emperor Napoleon I. The Revolutionary-Napoleonic era affected
the ways people thought about politics. Though the Revolution sought to limit arbitrary
government, the leadership of Emperor Napoleon ironically led to a government "far more
autocratic than the monarchy of the old regime" (Spielvogel 367).
During Emperor Napoleon's reign, crisis continued arising due to poor harvests. France
became more industrialized, and "the Church had less immediate relevance in an increasingly
urban environment" (Price 155). Property remained the source of social, intellectual, and moral
adequacy. Even though society seemed to be moving away from the church, there were still
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some who held to religious sentiments. Many believed that "it was God's will that France should
be cleansed of the remains of Jacobinism and atheism. They were inspired by an idealized
conception of a Christian society, with the chateau at its centre in every village" (Price 159). In
1801 , the Napoleonic Concordat established a privileged link between the French State and the
Vatican. The state recognized the Church's "special place in French life and compensated it for
its losses during the revolution by paying the stipends of the clergy" (Price 203). In 1802, they
extended this law to include Reformed and Lutheran Protestants and then Jews in 1803. Fath
calls what came to be an increase in the number of Protestant denominations along with other
religious convictions the "religious market" (Fath 402). This religious growth was rooted in the
abi lity to have individual choice in such areas as militancy and the refusal of the church state
system. What came to be known as evangel ical Christianity arose after the Geneva Revival
(181 7-20). French Protestantism included such key beliefs as personal conversion and the
inspiration of the Bible. As the Protestant movement continued during the early nineteenth
century, missions grew, leading to the creation of the Methodist and Baptist churches in France.
During this period evangelical Protestantism had the opportunity to develop as an " ultra-minority
group" and their "social role was broadly recognized" (Fath 401). Areas such as Brittany that had
deeply rooted histories in the Catholic tradition began to include more and more evangelical
communities by the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather than do away with religion, the
French State increased its ties with the Church.
Economic, political, and societal problems arose, but society kept fighting for a system
that would improve life. The Revolution had occurred because the government had moreover
shown excessive favor towards one element of this elite, the nobility, and in so doing threatened
the status which other notables had enjoyed since 1789. From the 1840s, capitalism grew and
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began to threaten artisanal traditions and work practices. Thus, the socialist ideal of a more
egalitarian society founded upon self-regulating producers' cooperatives grew in appeal. After
1834, a repressive government arose whose firm leadership kept society under control. This
resulted in a period of peace but not freedom. Society demanded universal suffrage once again.
The desire for political reform led to the creation of the Second Republic. The fight for universal
suffrage finally had an effect, albeit not universal, in 1848 when males could vote.
Ties between the Church and the state loosened again but would tighten when the state
sought a means to establish moral order. Louis-Napoleon became the new Emperor Napoleon III
under the Second Empire. The Second Empire enjoyed more support than previous governmental
systems. The policy of liberalization led to the loosened alliance between Church and state,
established during the Second Republic. The Third Republic began in 1870 after a military
defeat in war. The succession of the throne was passed on to the House of Orleans. This new
leadership was determined, with the assistance of the Church, to do the following:
[To] establish a regime devoted to re-establishing moral order. France needed to expiate
the sins which had caused God to inflict military defeat on her armies. Religious revival
seemed to promise both external, and through persuading everyone to accept the place in
society which God had chosen for them, internal security. It was increasingly the defense
of religion rather than monarchism which supplied cohesion and a sense of purpose to
conservatives during these early years of the Third Republic. (Price 195)
It seemed that religion was again becoming an influential part of the political sphere.

Even with these religious measures, France still installed certain secular measures. The
French government repealed the 1814 ban on Sunday work and re-established the right to
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divorce. A secular education system was established as a way to combat " clerical obscurantism,
of securing the emancipation of the individual and safeguarding the principles of 1789," referring
to the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen. However, Price asserts that, during this
period, "the status of the Roman Catholic church as the established state church was not
threatened" (Price 197).
However, in 1905, the disestablishment of the Church, or the separation of church and
state, terminated the Napoleonic Concordat. There was no longer a valid distinction between
"official religions" and "dissident religions" (Fath 402). In 1904, Catholic teaching orders had
already been suppressed and schools closed. When war broke out in 1914, the clericals believed
that men would turn to the Church in search of "hope and consolation" (206). The war greatly
surprised the vast majority of French citizens. A great sense of patriotism flooded France against
German militarism. Price states that ''the Catholic concept of the 'just war' and invocation of the
spirit of Joan of Arc was widely accepted, far more so than the clerical conception of this time of
trial as an opportunity for the expiation of sins. Nevertheless, the visible religious revival was
short-lived. Yet, as Price continues, "the role of the Church in helping to maintain patriotic
commitment should not be under-estimated. Neither should that of the schools and the pre-war
processes of socialization they had promoted and which were now being put to the test" (21 0).
The number of Protestant evangelicals grew from about 15,000 to 25,000 after the First World
War, though these numbers were dispersed (Fath 402). Evangelical Protestant Bible institutions
were created along with a well-established evangelical network. This growth included the
increase of training institutions where students received pastoral, evangelistic, or missionary
training.
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However, war had weakened France and would do so again during World War II. Eight
million men had been mobilized out of which 1,322, 100 men (16.6 percent) were killed by the
end of World War I. The post-war French economy experienced numerous hardships in its effort
to rebuild the war-stricken country. Politically speaking, conservative elites tried to maintain
their power while protests arose anytime this power was challenged. In the end, the Popular
Front, composed of Socialists and Radicals, won the elections. Then, the Second World War
broke out in France. Millions were taken captive and thousands killed by the Germans. After
such a catastrophic situation, the Church and the state "sought to collaborate in the reestablishment of 'moral order' " (Price 254). Marshal Petain, leader of the Vichy regime, hoped
that the French would adopt "some semblance of normality" among the chaos of war. " Catholics
in particular welcomed the regime's adoption of the Church's teaching on morality, the family
and the importance of spiritual values, and its benevolent attitude towards religious education"
(Price 255). Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons, insisted that " if we had remained victorious,
we would possibly have remained the prisoners of our errors. Through being secularized, France
was in danger of death" (Price 255). Once again France turned to the Church, if even for a short
amount of time, to foster French morale.
As the war progressed, the goal "changed from that of restoration of France to
participation in an increasingly desperate German-led crusade against the Bolshevik menace to
Europe." The Conseil National de la Resistance was created under the leadership of Charles de
Gaulle. It aimed to "dismantle and to nationalise the ' feudal ' economic empires, to involve
workers themselves in planning for a greater and more fairly shared prosperity and to create a
social security system." Working toward the institution of equality across classes, the state
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encouraged the move away from individualism toward the notion that "poverty was as much the
responsibility of society as of the individual" (Price 256, 268).

Finally, in 1945, economic and social stagnation came to an end. What followed was the

trente glor;euses, a period of"sustained economic growth and social transformation" (Price 272).
American aid through the Marshall Plan eased the strain of post-war reconstruction.

The

economic situation continued to improve, but inflation continued to rise. Price describes this
period:

Of the three generations alive in the 1960s, the oldest had been formed by the experience
of the First World War. Most had direct links with the rural world. Their children, born in
the 1920s and '30s, and relatively few in number, had been marked by the experience of
the second war and post-war austerity. This was nevertheless the generation which broke
with tradition, with the 'eternal France' . Their children, those of the 'baby boom' were
far more numerous, and had grown up in a world of plenty. These were the first children
of the consumer society, their values profoundly different from those of either their
parents or grand-parents ... Traditional religious and moral values were questioned as part
of a revolution in 'taste and expectations' . (288)

From 1942, France experienced the most rapid rate of demographic growth. Generous fami ly
allowances and a growing assurance in the future led families to have more children. During the
1970s, the growth rate decreased as those of the 'baby boom ' generation entered retirement age
and the newer generation preferred a smaller family in response to a consumer society. Women
also desired more personal autonomy and preferred to continue working in order to ameliorate
family living standards. More reliable methods of birth control made this easier, and the
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influence of the law and religion concerning sexual activity gradually declined. Many historians
hold that the 1975 law legalizing abortion did nothing more than relocate back-street abortions to
sanitary hospitals. While the family still remained the fundamental social unit, France
experienced a growing popularity of cohabitation outside marriage and of divorce. Also
important to mention is the change that occurred in homes. The focus of family life shifted from
the dining table to the television. One could say that "[g]reater spaciousness and physical
comfort was accompanied by changing life styles" (Price 290-2).
Particular economic and educational initiatives greatly affected daily life. In 1981, the
socialist party assumed power in France. France developed a welfare state. This helped reduce
"perceived inequality" (Price 293). Social security aimed to protect family living standards, and
economic expansion led to geographic and social mobility. The state played a major role in the
change of education. They aimed to instill a "common culture and sense of civic virtue." The
exception lay with private Catholic schools which were known for their firm discipline and their
"snob value" (Price 295). Yet this educational system has received much criticism "both for its
elitism and neglect of scientific and technical instruction" (Price 295).
As leisure time expanded for workers, Sunday church-going declined. The significance of
church-going declined, remaining merely a "formative cultural phenomenon." Religious
vocations collapsed in the 1950s. Priests aged and their numbers declined. Price says what
McLeod would later assert: that "a new Sunday, for a new society, and a mass culture emerged
in the 1960s" (Price 300). Pop culture emerged with such stars as Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie
Vartan. Holiday expenditures boomed. However, consumerism, individualism, materialism, and
decline of religious practice did not destroy the family, "the ultimate repository of moral values.
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In spite of divorce, family loyalties remain of central importance and are based on more effective
and less authoritarian relationships" (Price 301 ).
An increasing ambivalence toward institutions and moral rules has ar1sen, as well.

However, one must keep in mind that morality remains an area of debate especially in the
medical field. Medical institutions "have provided a secular brand of hope" in that the doctor' s
particular religious convictions normally bear no weight upon his practice (Bauberot 458).
However, many have become disillusioned since even the best medicine is no longer able to stop
certain diseases like AIDS. The implication of heavy medication and euthanasia has Jed to
debates that one could justifiably consider moral in nature. There was the belief that faith had
"surrendered to progress caused by growing uncertainty and questions about the appropriate
limits of progress" (Bauberot 462). The creation of the French National Ethics Advisory Council
played a significant role in that it was responsible for reflecting upon the ethical effects of
biotechnological progress. Here is an example of society' s hope increasingly resting on the
progression of science independent from religious institutions.
Since progress and freedom from religion do not prevent the issues of morality that seem
to inevitably arise, individuals become disenchanted with this whole notion of hope.
Consequently, there has been a "resurgence of traditionalist undercurrents" (Bauberot 459). New
religious movements have come about. So here is a very particular situation of disillusionment,
reillusionment, and globalization, as Bauberot puts it, that leads the masses to favor
" sensationalism over analysis in the news, emphasizing its entertainment value" and an
unrealistic notion of daily life (459).
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CHA YES' SECULARIZATION MODEL AND THE FRENCH CONTEXT

In the French context, it is impossible to ignore the deep roots of Christianity and of
Catholicism in particular. Though France shares numerous characteristics with other societies,
most notably European and North American, its own hi story and current affairs allow for certain
distinctions in the realm of secularization (Bauberot 451 ). Therefore, much of this analysis will
be devoted to dechristianization in France. This is done not to ignore or undervalue other
religions that may have been present and dynamic during this period, but rather, to consider the
religious environment of France as it relates to its historically prevalent religious affiliation. It
will be investigated how Chaves' categories of secularization- societal, institutional, and
individual-can apply to the history of France.
Societal secularization arose when French religious authority over politics and education
decreased. During the periods of absolute monarchism in France, the King exercised more
authority over religious affairs than the church over the political arena. One can argue for
societal secularization since the religious authority of the Church was not powerful enough to
exercise equal authority over the ruler. So rather than having a political figure highly dominated
by religious affairs, France had political rulers who dominated all aspects of life, including the
religious sphere. On the other hand, Church affairs and politics were so closely connected that
allegiance to the King meant allegiance to the Church and vice versa. When French society
demanded the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the Church did not have a strong
enough influence to change these policies. Bauberot states that, when the people established the
revolutionary Declaration, this created a sort of "secular religion." Though society wanted
change, history shows that this change was not particularly religious in nature. In fact, the
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Catholic Church felt that its authority was being challenged, and it was. The Church once had a
strong influence upon political and social life. The Reign of Terror abolished Sunday, a day set
apart for religious gathering, from the calendar. Later, the 1814 ban on Sunday work was
repealed. The Church's influence on society was declining.
Societal secularization also occurred through the separation of church and state and the
secularization of the French educational system. One of the most important secularization events
occurred with the 1905 termination of the Napoleonic Concordat and the separation of church
and state. The French today refer to the 1905 separation to argue against the Church's
involvement in political affairs. The same decree that lifted the 1814 ban on Sunday work also
eliminated the restriction against establishing a secular education system. Previously, the Church
had been the sole source of education, teaching students Biblical principles. However, education
began focusing on how to be good citizens and challenged traditional ways of thinking which
necessarily included religious teachings. Bauberot makes a distinction between "freedom of
conscience" and "freedom of thought." While "freedom of conscience" allows for "diversity of
belief in society and the freedom to express those beliefs," "freedom of thought ensures the right
to independently reexamine beliefs received from family, social groups, and society as a whole.
This way, a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them or tum from them to something
else." The French began to view school as an institution where students are taught to "exploit
their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom of thought" (Bauberot 461). Today,
many people do not consider private Catholic schools to be any more religious than public
schools. Many parents send their children to religiously affiliated schools for the good education
rather than for the religious benefit. Secularization is present in many areas of French society.
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The same examples from "Chaves' Secularization Model and Europe" apply when
discussing institutional secularization in France. The Sorbonne has already been cited as an
example of institutional secularization. Other examples of religiously affiliated universities and
schools decreasing or eliminating the importance placed upon religion would reasonably justify
institutional secularization. However, no other significant evidence exists which defends
institutional secularization in France.
There is no doubt that individual secularization has occurred on multiple levels in France.
The Enlightenment was a clear source of individual-level secularization. One of the main objects
of Enlightenment philosophy was to direct the individual's attention toward the self--one's
thoughts and actions. The philosophers did not encourage individuals to look to the Church or to
God for hope but to modern advances and even to personal thought. Additionally, the
individual's perspective of absolute monarchs transformed. The Church and the King used this
idea of absolutism to gain control over people through this idea of divine rule. If individuals did
not respect the absolute monarch who supposedly wielded divine right, there were eternal
consequences. The Church played a large role in controlling society's actions and allegiance to
the King. This tactic generally succeeded until revolutionary sentiments gradually weakened and
eventually destroyed the King's authority. The people no longer feared eternal consequences if
they disobeyed the King. Louis XVI was tried and executed by guillotine January 21, 1793.
Individual secularization broke down the fear of eternal punishment.
The Church experienced more individual-level secularization as time progressed. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen liberated people from the traditional religious
authority. Anticlericalism arose as a result of rebellion against the authority of the Church in
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societal and individual affairs. Bauberot claims that the founding of secularization in France
began with the " political victory of the anticlerical movement." It is said that the anticlericalism
in France during the Third Republic produced a mainly pacifist secularization, though
secularization nonetheless (Bauberot 461-2). During the Third Republic, the right to divorce was
reinstated, as well. In essence, the Catholic Church exerted their power to such a great extent that
they, in fact, undermined their own authority. While evidence reveals a persistence of traditional
religious customs in certain areas despite the Terror's efforts to undermine Christianity, in some,
the growing reliance upon man and technology weakened the French's reliance upon the Church.
After the Second World War, France experienced an increase in individual-level
secularization. As society moved toward socialist measures, an intriguing situation occurred:
France, a historically Christian country, insisted that poverty was a societal responsibility.
Christianity's Bible teaches that followers of Christ should help the poor (Acts 9:36). Rather than
encourage the people to help the poor based upon this Christian principle, they appeal to the
individual and his or her allegiance to this all-encapsulating image of society, not the image of
Christian community and good-will. The religious authority was not influential enough to keep
individuals from questioning traditional religious and moral values or from becoming entrenched
in this new consumerism, at odds with the Christian mentality of giving rather than receiving
(Matt. 10:8; 2 Cor. 9:7). Whereas the Church taught sexual abstinence outside of marriage, the
religious influence upon sexual activity declined. The Biblical teaching concerning sexual
activity as a means of procreation also lost influence as women sought more reliable methods of
birth control in order to remain at work. The decline in church attendance also showed individual
secularization since the Church was not able to convince many of the importance of churchgoing and Christian fellowship. Family still remained the most important foundation of morality
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but with less focus on religion and more concentration on family loyalty itself. This contrasted
the previous concept of each family as part of many Christian families within society. Price
states that, as priests aged and declined in number, there arose "clear signs of a crisis and of an
inability to combat secularization, especially on such crucial moral questions as abortion and
contraception and this in spite of the development of a less rigorist moral theology" (300).
AGAINST THE TREND

Chaves' main argument asserts that, to call a society secularized, the society has to have
evidence of secularization at all three levels- societal, institutional, and individual.

We

observed strong historical data supporting secularization at the societal and individual levels.
Since the number of examples concerning institutional secularization is not as high as the other
two levels, one can argue low-level secularization. However, French history shows examples of
society working against this secularization trend, especially through Protestantism.
Even though this idea of secularization grew to have great pull in French society
especially after the Revolution, certain efforts to strengthen the bond between Church and state
show France's particularly unique history. After the Reformation and the rise of limited
tolerance, the Catholic Church lost its control of individuals' denominational choice. This
indicated both societal and institutional secularization because of the lack of authority the
Church exercised over individuals. In contrast, Napoleon enacted the Concordat during a time
when secularization was already happening within France. The extension of the Concordat to
include Protestants and Jews demonstrated how the French government saw, if not the historical
foundations, then the societal importance of religion. Fath describes the period from the
Concordat (1801-1802) to the First World War (1914-1918) as a "slow learning process of
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religious pluralism in a controlled religious market" where the state played a key role (400). Fath
believes that the extension of the Concordat system (180 1) to include Reformed and Lutheran
Protestants (1802) and Jews (1808) points to the "first stage of laicization", or the decrease in the
Catholic Church' s authority through the extension of rights to other churches (Fath 401). The
growing number of Protestants after the Geneva Revival indicate that, even with the rise of
secularization in certain instances, Christianity thrived rather well as history suggests. Overall,
the historical context was very important in this situation. Unlike the historical context in which
limited tolerance arose, an underlying secularization already existed when Napoleon enacted the
Concordat. Therefore, the extension of rights to other denominations suggests a move toward
religion, Protestant Christianity in particular.
French history continues to reveal this back and forth movement between religious fervor
and secularized hope. Though the ties between the Church and state had loosened, the Third
Republic and the House of Orleans reestablished those ties. The House of Orleans desired a
renewing of moral order, and not through societal progress but through the Church. Regardless
of certain trends in secularization, it is evident that the religious influence upon society and the
individual was strong enough to lead the government to see its necessity in encouraging moral
order. Yet this did not dissuade the government from repealing the 1814 ban on Sunday work,
from reinstating the right to divorce, or from establishing a secular education system. These last
examples of individual and societal secularization reveal the move toward secularization that
persisted despite governmental actions to support the link between society and the Church.
Though bursts of religious sentiment continued, these instances were short-lived. When
France became embroiled in World War I, political leaders used religious dialogue and
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encouraged the Church's teaching on morality in order to bring hope to the masses of
disenchanted citizens. The fact that these religiously-based campaigns were successful, if even
for a short period of time, reveals the significance the Church historically played in the lives of
past generations. This makes the idea of secularization in such a setting that much more
interesting. It is possible that there is no such thing as pure secularization. Society is always
mixed with some religion. Even if these situational revivals did not seem to have a long-term
effect, they are important nonetheless.
THE PROTESTANT EXCEPTI ON

As stated earlier, Protestantism began growing in France. Fath offers additional data
concerning Protestant growth and considers this as an exception to the secularization principle.
Between 1960 and 2005, the French religious market continued to diversify (Fath 403). The
numbers of evangelicals increased from 100,000 to almost 350,000 with large numbers corning
from

Pentecostals

(200,000),

Baptists

(40,000),

and

Charismatics.

Other

important

denominations include Brethren Assemblies, Mennonites, Methodists, and others (Fath 403).
"Whereas the Catholic Church has had to close seminaries, evangelical Protestants have had to
respond to increased demand for training." Such demand led to the creation of the Free Faculty
of Evangelical Theology in Vaux-sur-Seine (Faculte Libre de Theologie Evangelique) in 1965,
and then the Free Reformed Theology Seminary at Aix-en-Provence in 1974 (Faculte Libre de
Theolgie Reformee) (Fath 404). Yet Fath admits this period is poorly documented.
In the late 1980s, there were numerous evangelical Protestant campaigns in France such

as Billy Graham's French campaign in 1986, Charles Colson's visit to Paris in 1980, the "Fete de
l 'Evangile" near Nirnes in 1980, the "Fete de Jeunesse" in 1985 in Vincennes, "Mission France"
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with Billy Graham in 1986 in Paris and province, "Fetons l'Evangile" near Nimes, "Mondial
sport et foi" in Paris and province, and "Pentecost 2000" in Valence. Nonetheless, the 350,000
people that make up the French Protestants represent only 0.5% of the French population. In
other words, French Protestantism remains marginal.
Fath offers two hypotheses for this: first, some see this as a sect that necessarily refuses
modernity. Secondly, some argue that evangelical growth is not easily "transplanted" into the
French situation. Fath states that many historians view evangelicalism as "an exogenous
disruption of the traditional French religious field" (Fath 406). They see evangelicalism as
having mainly an Anglo-Saxon origin. It is true that the Anglo-Saxon world has had a
tremendous impact upon French evangelical Protestantism, especially after 1945. Dozens of
American evangelical missions started work in France. However, such influence was frowned
upon when many saw that these efforts generated dependence, especially financial , upon
Americans. Thus, the French evangelical Protestants faced losing some of their independence to
a culture other than their own. This led many to reject the label "Protestant" to avoid the
"American style" (Fath 407 -8). The third hypothesis is that evangelical churches found a certain
"niche" in marginalized populations. Fath conjectures that evangelical churches became "places
of community for transitional populations that are on the margins of a society into which they
intend (or not) to fit" (408). Fath looks to the growth of ethnic churches as evidence of this
hypothesis. It is important to note that the French republican tradition stands often "hostile" to
such intermediary communities; they view them as "a threat to what is expected today of
religious correctness: diversity, tolerance and openness" (Fath 408).
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Some objections concerning evangelicalism in France are based upon the belief that
evangelicals are secluded. Fath shows how this stigma does not hold since evangelicals widely
network. This eliminates Weber's and Troeltsch's "sect" type used " to describe the religious
framework of evangelical assemblies" (Fath 409). This use of networking even allows churches
to join in the debates of global society. Furthermore, evangelicalism includes a major element of
socialization. According to Fath, "most French evangelicals seem to be strongly engaged with
their society and their own national culture. French evangelicals educate their children in the
public school system contrary to American evangelicals, who often choose to educate their
children in private institutions or at home" (Fath 41 0).
Some believe that American assistance and influence upon evangelicalism has caused
some French evangelicals to become more American-like. However, this is not a strong
argument since the French have since moved away from dependence toward independent
growth. They have been able to appreciate the positive influence Americans have made upon the
French situation while retaining their own cultural identity. Fath even states that there is a
"French way" of being an evangelical, such as their tradition of drinking alcohol and wine,
unlike traditional American evangelicals.
Overall, French evangelicals present an interesting case for those bent upon proclaiming
absolute secularization or even the death of religion. Fath suggests that perhaps this indicates a
transition in Europe "from a tightly structured religious market dominated by the unbalanced
church-sect couple, to a more open and competitive market in which several denominations
(among other types of religious organizations) coexist" (414).
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ORLEANS: A BRI EF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The history of Orleans is closely linked to the history of France as a whole. One aspect
that differs is the weight given to Joan of Arc, La Pucelle. The story of her bravery in rallying
the French forces against the English during the Hundred Years' War stands out as an inspiring
piece of early history. Later during the late 16th century and the War of Religions, the city of
Orleans was taken by Huguenots and greatly damaged. When Louis Philippe became king in
1830 after the Glorious Revolution and with the beginning of the Restoration after the flight of
Charles X and the Bourbons, the throne of France returned to the line of Orleans.

Orleans

suffered more destruction when it was attacked by the Prussians in 1870-71, by Italian forces in
1940, and by the U.S. army in 1944. Since World War II, the old city has been extensively
restored.

Orleans was also the birthplace of Charles Peguy, a Christian poet, philosopher,

socialist, and patriot, who, regardless of the radical anticlericalism of the late 191h and early 20th
centuries, held firmly to his faith and integrity, testifying to the power of his faith. He, thus, had
a great impact upon French intellectual thought (Konnert 148-9). Currently, an estimated
120,000 people live in Orleans (116,515 according to the 2008 official census) ("Populations
legales 2008"). This is the historic city in which I conducted numerous interviews for my
research.
R ESEARC H IN ORLEANS

CHOOSING THE QUESTIONS

Before going to France, I had just begun my study of Chaves' "New Differentiation
Theory". As I formulated questions to ask the Orleanais, I avoided choosing questions solely
based upon Chaves' theory so as to avoid creating evidence that would automatically support a
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theory that I had not yet fully explored. I chose ten questions that would not be too invasive
while giving me a deeper perspective of the religious environment of Orleans. Upon returning to
the States, I was able to further analyze Chaves' theory and the possibilities of incorporating it
into my research. Eventually, I decided that Chaves' secularization theory would provide an
interesting case study for secularization in Orleans, France.
THE QUESTIONS

The semester before going to Orleans, France, I formulated ten questions that would give
me a better perspective of the religious environment of Orleans according to the Orleanais. I
asked the following questions:
1. Are you familiar with any churches in Orleans?
2. Do you go to church?
3. Are you Catholic, Protestant, or other?
4. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
5. Do you believe that there are a lot of Christians in Orleans, or in France in general?
6. Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?
7. Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what
other religions?
8. What do the majority of French, or specifically Orleanais think of religion?
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9. Does the image of religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks
about Catholicism or Christianity in general?
10. Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?
These questions led to very interesting and informative interviews that gave me a first-hand
perspective of religion in France.
AMONG THE PEOPLE

During my semester abroad in the fall of 2009, I set off to the bustling streets of
downtown Orleans, interviewing anybody who would take the time to answer ten questions.
During weekends and after classes, I interviewed passers-by, loungers outside of the mall, and
walkers along the banks of the Loire. I also interviewed some church-goers at a local church I
attended. I interviewed a wide age range and tried to interview an even number of males and
females (however, I inevitably ended up interviewing a greater number of women). In all, I
spoke with 100 French citizens as well as three Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest in
Orleans. All interviewees signed a consent form indicating they understood that their information
would be kept anonymous. Thus, names of interviewees and churches will not be used within
this paper.
RESULTS

Question

Response
Yes

No

No Response/ Don't Know

81%

14%

5%

(Q I) Are you familiar with any churches in Orleans?
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Yes

(Q 2) Do you go to church?

(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?

Occasionally

No

Rarely

Only to Family
Events

II%

58%

6%

5%

19%

Catholic

Protestant

Atheist/
nothing_

Muslim

Other

9%

29%

7%

4%

47%

Yes
No

(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?

26%
74%

(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in
Orleans or in France in general?

Yes

No

59%

20%

Increasing

(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or
decreasing?

20%

Decreasing

Stagnant

Don ' t Know

62%

II %

12%

8%

Islam

No Response/
Don' t Know

Buddhism

Sects

Atheism

Other

II%

7%

54%

5%

Don ' t
Know

(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taki_ng the
place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?

(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais

37%

20%

Refer to Appendix B for detailed responses.

think of religion?

Yes

No

No Response/
Don' t Know

26%

64%

9%

(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings
(cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about
Catholicism or Christianity in general?
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(Q I 0) Do you believe religion should play a role in

politics? Why or why not?

Yes

No

12%

84%

No Response/
Don 't Know
3%

CA TEGORiZING THE QUESTIONS

After organizing the data, I incorporated it into Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory". I
matched the questions to Chaves' categories- societal, institutional, and individual-level
secularization- based upon the potential to reveal enlightening links between the interview data
and secularization.
I placed three of the questions within the societal level category. First, I chose the
question about religion and politics. I justified this placement based upon the way education and
politics are subjects that can reveal societal secularization, as seen earlier in the context of
secularization and France. Furthermore, I included two of the questions that would reveal the
extent to which Christians and churches influence the everyday life of the

Orh~anais.

These

questions were whether 1.) interviewees were aware of other churches in the area besides the
main cathedral, St. Croix, and whether 2.) he or she believed there were many Christians in
Orleans. In this sense, these last two questions address the scope of influence Christians and
churches have within everyday life of the Orleanais. If a substantial number of people are
opposed to any influence between religion and politics, and if they are not aware of any
churches, perhaps societal secularization exists.
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Fitting a question into the institutional category was challenging since Chaves' examples
are specific. Earlier, I stated that the divergence away from Christian theology as a university 's
major domain reveals institutional secularization. This has been the case with the University of
Orleans which emphasized theology but later law and the sciences, engineering, and the arts.
Since the gradual divergence from hiring Christian teachers in religiously affiliated schools
indicates secularization, one can reasonably conclude that the transformation of religious
buildings such as cathedrals into non-religious buildings would also indicate institutional
secularization. The data reveals that many individuals today consider the cathedral in Orleans to
be simply a beautiful monument for tourism. This actually applies to all of Europe since many
cathedrals are now historical monuments. One cathedral in Glasgow, Scotland has even been
converted into a night club and pub. One can logically justify the use of this fact in analyzing
institutional secularization. Although Chaves does not cite this as a specific example of
institutional secularization, I believe there is some evidence regarding it.
More questions naturally lean toward the individual-level category. Within the
individual-level secularization analysis, I included the questions about the interviewees'
denomination; whether they consider themselves religious or not; opm10ns concemmg the
French views of religion; and church attendance. Since these questions are related to personallevel secularization opinions, convictions, or practices, they easily work within the individuallevel category.
Two of the questions did not easily fit into Chaves' categories. Whether interviewees
believed Christianity was increasing or decreasing and if they believed another system of belief
was augmenting in its place were two questions that revealed interesting information about the
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Orleanais personal views even if the questions do not fit into Chaves' categories. Even so, these
questions provide new and interesting data utilized in this study.
CONCLUSIONS

After utilizing Chaves' secularization theory as the analytical framework of my research
data, I conclude that Orleans has low-level secularization. The answers to the questions
concerning societal secularization and politics were not surprising. From my other research,
separation of Church and State has always seemed to be a strong view for many French.
However, the results concerning societal awareness of churches were higher than one would
expect from a completely secularized city. With 65 percent being aware of other churches
besides the main cathedral, it seems as though Orleans institutions are moderately effective in
spreading the word or at least making their presence known. One would expect a higher
percentage of interviewees within a heavily secularized city to be unaware of any sort of
religious presence within the city. Surprisingly, 59 percent of interviewees believe that there are
many Christians in Orleans and France in general. The scope of religious authority, specifically
that of Christianity, on politics is definitely minimal, even nonexistent. However, the results of
the other two questions show that churches still hold enough authority to make many Orleanais
aware of their presence and to also convince citizens to believe that there are many Christians in
Orleans and France.
Institutional secularization is difficult to determine in Orleans since Chaves' theory is not
as clear at this point. It has already been established that the once religiously oriented schools
such as the University of Orleans are presently completely secularized. Additionally, cathedrals
once had a strong religious influence in people' s lives but are now less so. Orleans' history
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makes a difference on how one analyzes secularization. Had this city's university not had a
strong religious affiliation, this example would not prove to be a claim to institutional
secularization. Thus, one can conclude that Orleans is institutionally secularized according to the
declining and possibly nonexistent authority the Church currently holds regarding universities
and cathedrals.
The study showed mixed results for secularization at the individual level. When asked
about church attendance, 30 percent said they went to church or at least went to church
occasionally. This low percentage would seem to suggest secularization; however, the European
Values Study from 1999 reported that 12 percent of the French go to church at least once a
month (McLeod 71). So even though Orleans' percentage seems low, it represents more than
twice the percentage from 1999. Seventy-one percent of interviewees in Orleans claimed to be a
part of some kind of religious denomination with the majority claiming Catholicism. This
percentage is also higher than the 1999 study which showed 57 percent belonging to a religious
denomination. The percentage of those claiming Catholicism in France in 1999 (53 percent) is
about the same as in Orleans (47 percent). Yet, in Orleans, 9 percent claimed Protestantism while
only 2 percent in France belonged to Protestantism in 1999. However, this being the case in 1999
one cannot completely know since data for Orleans in 1999 is not available. To continue, 29
percent of Orleans claimed either atheism or no religious affiliation, whereas 43 percent in
France reported that they did not belong to any religion. Therefore, it appears that Orleans
represents a specific case in France where a greater percentage of people claim a religious
denomination. As stated earlier, former historical or sociological studies revealing trends or
differences make a difference upon how one views secularization in Orleans. Moreover, the fact
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that more than half of interviewees in Orleans claimed a Christian denomination indicates signs
of low-level secularization.
The responses to the question "Do you consider yourself a religious person?" caution us
from jumping to conclusions about religious belief and practice in Orleans. Though 71 percent
claimed a religious denomination, a low percentage claimed to be religious. This reinforces the
low-level secularization rather than a non-secularized status. Of the 71 percent claiming a
denomination, 58 percent claim not to be religious. Twenty-six percent of interviewees in
Orleans claimed to be religious, representing about half of the percentage from the 1999 study
(44 percent). Seventy-two percent of Catholics said that they did not consider themselves to be
religious people. In contrast, 78 percent of the Protestants and 71 percent of the Muslims
interviewed considered themselves to be religious. Although the previous results show increasing
numbers in church attendance and adherence to religious denominations, still a great percentage
of Orleanais do not consider themselves to be religious. Since the results do not show increasing
or high levels of individual-level secularization in all the categories of questions, I am reluctant
to categorize Orleans as a high-level of individual secularization.
Considering the responses to the question " What do the majority of French or Orleanais
think of religion", one can see religion does not hold too much influence in their lives. Joining
these responses with the 62 percent who believe that Christianity is declining, it is reasonable to
state that Orleans is secularized at all three levels, societal, institutional, and individual, but at a
low-level.
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A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

In addition to the 100 French I interviewed, I also had the opportunity to interview three
Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest to hear their perspective on the religious environment
of Orleans and to see how their responses differed from the other interviews, if at all. The pastors
whom I interviewed stayed in close contact with other churches within the Christian community
of Orleans, so their points of view have allowed me to see another facet of religious life in
Orleans from credible sources.
I interviewed one Baptist pastor from Orleans who said that, in his church, between 80
and 100 adults plus 20 children regularly attend the services. I asked him whether he thought
Christians in Orleans felt free to talk about their beliefs with others. He responded positively,
stating that, in general, Christians in Orleans do feel free but only in the sense that they are not
restricted by law. Though talking about one's faith, he added, demands courage to stand up
against mockery and indifference. In answer to why mockery and indifference exist within the
city, he cited the fact that France is democratic and citizens have great freedom, but that some
are afraid to affirm their faith because of poorly understood secularism (here secularism refers to
that which is separated from religion, or !arc; not to be confused with Chaves' definition of
secularization). Furthermore, this pastor affirmed a growing tendency for young people to be less
religious than their parents. When asked about the church and politics, his response confirmed
the responses of the majority of interviewees who said that religion should not play a role in
politics since there are so many belief systems in France. The Baptist pastor stated that he did not
believe that a specifically Christian political party would have a large impact in France. Overall,
he expressed that Christianity is declining in France even though it is rising in other countries.
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I also spoke with a pastor of an evangelical church with a congregation of about 100
adults or 140 including children. He agreed that Christians in Orleans and France as a whole are
free to talk about their faith, but are timid. The secularized (!ale) nature of the state makes one
reluctant to talk about one's faith in public. He said that proselytizing is viewed badly in France
though not restricted. When asked about the trend of Christianity, his responses were very
interesting. He said that Catholicism and historical Protestantism, or the Reformed Church, were
declining while evangelical churches like Pentecostalism were progressing. He said that many
think Protestants compared to Catholics, are "nicer, cooler, livelier." He believes some find the
Jack of hierarchy within Protestantism more appealing than Catholicism which, according to
some, is old, outmoded, not in contact with life or with young people. Yet even having said all
this, he still sees some Catholic churches that are trying to increase in congregational numbers.
The evangelical pastor sees himself and other Christians as a minority in France, but he prefers
this. He believes that it is more important to have authentic faith than to have great numbers.
I also had the opportunity to interview a pastor of a Reformed Church in Orleans.
Approximately 400 families have registered with his church, though only about 150 individuals
regularly attend. He stated that these numbers line up with the majority of churches in France
whose regular attendees equal about one-half of the total registered number. In his church, the
older individuals make up the majority. The younger go to the services less frequently. Still, a
sizeable number of 15-30 year olds attend the services.
Regarding freedom to speak about beliefs, the Reformed pastor said that few in France
speak often about their faith. Children learn very early that one must not talk about beliefs with
their elementary and high school professors. They are, according to Reformed pastor, practically
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trained not to talk about their faith. The prevalent idea is that religion is private, thus one should
not talk about it just as one would not talk about money. In response to a question addressing the
difference between what the French think about Catholics versus Protestants, he stated that many
negative images of Catholicism exist, so Catholics must justify themselves as Catholics. The
image of Protestantism is better, more pleasant.
He believes that the number of those who practice Christianity is declining. In his church,
the number of marriages and baptisms is in decline. On the other hand, the number of those
interested in church events has increased. Overall, he worries about the increase in individualism
and independence he is witnessing within the church. He has observed a loss in the sense of
community. Individualism is currently very strong in France.
The Reformed pastor made some interesting observations among those who claim the
Catholic tradition. Catholics, he says, desire a certain liberty they see in Protestantism. In fact,
Catholics are in the process of pursuing practices that resemble Protestantism. Furthermore, the
Catholic Church as a whole is in the process of revising its methods of counting the number of
Catholics in France. The Church, according to the Reformed pastor, will begin taking into
account non-practicing Catholics. Because of this, he sees the possibility of a state where the
majority is in fact not Catholic.
While the other Protestant pastors said that the majority of French consider cathedrals to
be historical monuments or just a building that gives a church more credibility, the Reformed
pastor said that a sort of paradox exists concerning religious buildings like cathedrals. He
affirmed that the buildings have a symbolic function even though people practice religion less
frequently. According to this pastor, the buildings reassure the people of the existence of God as
55

would a photo of one' s grandfather- a photo that shows one's roots. He recounted one specific
event when the city hall of Orleans wanted to demolish an old church. A sociologist interviewed
the people and every interviewee was against this action-"One must keep the building!" This
adds an intriguing twist to the data concerning secularization in Orleans.
Finally, I interviewed a Catholic priest. After interviewing the Protestant pastors, I had
the strong impression that the influence of religious authority in the lives of the

Orh~anais

was

minimal at best. However, I was surprised to hear that this church had three separate masses to
accommodate the 1,000+ congregants. Each of the services varies in the age range of attendees.
Few young people attend the early service, opting for the evening service. The second service is
composed of many couples with children. This priest agreed with the Protestant pastors that the
majority of French were becoming more and more individualistic. In fact, he said that the
number of priests was in decline. Catholics were being forced to reorganize into smaller groups.
He stated that many consider religion to be a taboo. The French are hesitant and do not dare talk
about their faith with others.
Being a Catholic priest, he was able to reveal the attitudes many had toward Catholicism.
First of all, he asserted that, when one thinks about Christianity in France, one thinks about
Catholicism since, historically, the majority has been Catholic. Yet when one thinks about
Catholicism today, one thinks about weighty positions of hierarchy (bishops and priests who are
distant from everyday life). This has Jed many to consider Protestantism in a more positive way
since less is known about it compared to Catholicism (which includes its history of unreasonably
wealthy churches and, more seriously, pedophi lia). However, Catholics are still finding ways to
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adapt and live. Still this priest acknowledges that the large number of congregants in his church
represents a very unique situation in France.
WHAT'S REPLACING CHRiSTIANITY?

So what is replacing Christianity, if anything? Of all the interviewees, 37 percent said
that Islam was gradually taking the place of Christianity. Many cited examples of immigration to
justify this rise. Eleven percent said Buddhism, and 7 percent said different sects. The majority
of responses, 54 percent, reveal that the French believe the trend is still in favor of atheism. The
Baptist pastor whom I interviewed agreed that Islam was increasing. Yet due to indifference and
a lack of knowledge concerning what Christianity really is, the overall trend shows an increase in
atheism. The evangelical pastor also agreed that Islam was increasing. However, he believed that
the kind of atheism which was once very anti-Christian is decreasing, being replaced by an
increasing "21st century spiritualism". He added that many assume a sort of relativism ("I believe
this; you believe that, and this is good"). He stated that Europe has been given the nickname "the
dark continent" since many believe Europe to be completely secularized. However, the
evangelical pastor believes that Europe is somewhat wrongly named since there are still
Christians in Europe. The Reformed Pastor stated that the majority of French are more likely to
be agnostic but that the number of people who hold to some type of spirituality is increasing.
Buddhism is also increasing in adherents. Many are choosing their own system of beliefs or are
turning to esoteric philosophies such as those found in yoga and in "well-being" spiritualism. On
the whole, the priest said that, even though Muslim numbers increase, nothing is really taking
Christianity's place except indifference. The interviews with the Protestant pastors and the
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Catholic priest along with those of the 100 French citizens revealed intriguing perspectives that
greatly aid this research on secularization in Orleans, France.
CONCLUD I NG REMARKS

Chaves' ''New Differentiation Theory" within the European context provided an
intriguing framework for this case study on secularization in Orleans, France. After analyzing the
European and French historical backgrounds, it seemed unlikely that one would be able to
reasonably apply Chaves' theory at the city level since so much uncertainty remained concerning
institutional secularization. Delving into institutional-level secularization proved to be
complicated when considering a country or continent. However, analysis proved to be more
reasonable on the smaller, city scale by looking at the secularization of universities and religious
buildings such as cathedrals. Therefore, one could state that Chaves' categories proved more
feasible on the city level. On the other hand, it is possible that examples of institutional
secularization such as described by Chaves exist on the continental and country level but that
more research is necessary. One can moderately accept secularization on all three levels for all
three contexts- Eur opean, French, and Orh!anais- but with reservation.
Overall, it is clear that Chaves' secularization theory provides a unique opportunity to
explore different levels of analysis. By categorizing the interview responses, one can approach
the research data from a new perspective. Despite the lack of details concerning institutional
secularization at the continental and state levels, one can still use the examples Chaves provides
to show secularization in Orleans, France, though at a low-level. While society shows a move
toward atheism, high church attendance at one of Orleans' cathedrals continues. Thus, one could
argue against high-level secularization. Taking all the historical, sociological, and interview
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research into account, this study m secularization theory, specifically of Chaves' "New
Differentiation Theory", provides an interesting framework by which one can explore
secularization in Europe, France, and, specifically, Orleans. I hope other researchers will be able
to utilize this information to continue studies on the religious environment of Orleans, France.
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Appendix A

DATA SU MMARY

(Categori=ed according to Chaves' "Nelv Differentiation Theory")

Societal Questions
Overa ll Results (100)
Number of Responses
Question
YES

NO

No Response/Don't Know

(Q 10) Do you believe religion
should play a role in politics?
Why or why not?

12

84

3

(Q I) Arc you familiar with any
churches in Orleans?

81

14

5

Institutional Questions
Overall Results (100)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 9) Does the image of these rel igious
buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on
what one thmks about Cathohcasm or
Christianity an general?

YES

NO

No response/Don't Know

26

64

9

60

Individual Questions
Overall Results (100)
Question
(Q 2) Do :rou go to
church?

(Q 3) Are you
Catholic, Protestant,
other'?

YES

Occasionally

NO

Rarely

Onl) to Fam1ly
Events

19

II

58

6

5

Catholic

Protestant

Atheist/Nothing

Muslim

Other

47

9

29

7

I Jehovah's Witness
I Agnostic
I CathJProt
I Christian who
claims neither Cath.
nor Prot.

(Q 4) Do you
consider yourself a
rei igious person?

YES

26

(of the total of
'' YES " responses)

(of the total af "YES"
responses)

(of the total of
"YES" responses)

(of the total of
" YES" responses)

Professing Catholic

Professing Protestant

Professing Muslim

Other

8

7

5

I Jehovah 's W1tness
I Christian 11 ho
claims neither Cath.
nor Prot.

NO
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(Q 8) What do the
maJonty of French
or Orleana•s thmk of
religion?

(of the total of
''NO" responses)

(of the total of "NO"
responses)

(of the total of
"NO" responses)

(of the total of
"NO" responses)

Professing Catholic

Professing Protestant

Professing Muslim

Other

34

I

5

I CathJProt.

(Refer to data below for more specific details)

61

General Questions
Overall Results (100)
Question

Increasing

Decreasmg

Stagnant

Don't Know

8

62

II

12

(Q 6) Do you bel ieve Chnstlamty IS
increastng or decreasing?

(Q 7) Is there another system of belief
that's taking the place of Christianity? If
yes, what other religions?

Islam

Buddhism

Sects

Other

Athe1sm

Don't
Know

37

II

7

3 Agnosticism

54

20

2 Judaism
I Scientology

62

Appendix B
DATA BREAKDOWN

Societal Questions
Aged 18-24
Number of Responses
Question

(Q I 0) Do )OU believe religion should
play a role in politics? Why or why not?

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

4

46

2

7 mtervie"ecs said
somethmg about the t\\0
not workmg \\ell together
and eausmg conll1ct \\hen
m1\ed 4 SaJd no because
there are a lot of rehg1ons
and 4 sa1d no because
rcllg1on and politics arc not
the same.
One person sa1d, ·'No! This
IS 2009!"
Another "No, but I don 't
know why"
And yet another said, "No,
the world leads politics"

(Q I) Are you fam1llar \~ith any churches
in Orleans?

44

7

2

14 of mterv1ewees lnow
on I)' maJor cathedrals hl..e
St CrOI\

(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of
Christians m Orleans or in France in
general?

35

13

4

I person sa1d 50150Chnstlan!Musllm

2 people sa1d ··no, there are
not a lot of practicing
Christians"

63

Age 25-34
Number of Responses
Question

Do )OU believe religion should play a role

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

2

10

I

2 mentioned that this IS too
difficult with man) beliefs

m politics? Why or why not?

One even said no because
she belteves the Pope has
different ideas than the rest
of the \\Orld.
One said )'CS, in order to
change the point ofv1ew of
thmgs m relauon to
catastrophes-faith"
Arc you familiar with any churches in
Orleans?

8

3

2

2 mtcrviewees were
Muslim.
I interviC\\ee sa1d slhe
I.. new only St Cro"
Cathedral

Do you believe there arc a lot of
Christians in Orleans or in France in
general?

4

3

6

Spill with the maJority not
being sure

Aged 35-49 (13)
Number of Responses
Question

Do you believe religion should play a role

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

2

II

0

One said that countries
where religion is b1g are
not good countries

in politics? Why or why not?

Another sa1d, '·No, \\e are
a commumty of people. If
someone does not believe
the same thing, that causes
problems with the
community. That will not
allow for cho1ce..,
One said yes since people
arc very attached to
relig1on in general
Are you familiar with any churches m
Orleans?

II

I

I

I interviewee was Muslim
so mentioned how he knew
Mosques in the area

64

Do ) ou believe there are a lot of

8

2

3

Chrisllans m Orleans or in France in
general?

Aged 50-64 (13)
Number of Responses
Question
YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

Do you believe religion should play a role
in politics? Why or why not?

0

13

0

Several mentioned
that there are a lot of
religions. They
especially mentioned
the rise of Islam .

Are you familiar with any churches in
Orleans?

12

I

0

2 said they knew a lot
of churches

Do you believe there are a lot of
Chns11ans in Orleans or in France in
general?

7

0

6

Evenly split between
yes and unsure

Aged 65+ (8)
Number of Responses
Question

Do you believe religion should play a role
in poliucs? Why or why not?

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

4

4

0

Equal spl it.
2 said that religion should
play a role in politics but
not as much as Germany.
2 mentioned thetr
dtsagreement with the
Pope's convicllons

Are you familiar with any churches in
Orleans?

6

2

0

2 said they were familiar
with all of them
One specified several
Catholics and Protestants
churches.
I mentioned just the St
Croix

Do you believe there are a lot of
Chnstians in Orleans or in France in
general?

5

2

I

2 said there were a lot less
Protestants than Catholics

65

Institutional Questions
Aged 18-24 (53)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 9) Does the image of these relig1ous
buildmgs (cathedrals) have an effect on
what one thinks about Catholicism or
Christianity in general?

YES

NO

No response!?

Notes

13

34

5

Several said :res. for those
who are Catholic or who
believe in God.
" Yes, they give an image
of life."
" If there are more churches
m a City, this city is more
Catholic."
''Yes, it reflects the image
of Christianity."
"No, people give an 1mage
of religion, not the
building itself."

Aged 25-34 (13)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 9) Does the image of these religious
buildmgs (cathedrals) have an effect on
what one thinks about Catholicism or
Christianity in general?

YES

NO

No response!?

Notes

3

10

0

"One thinks about Jesus
and the Gospel"
"There is historical
importance: it shows the
political power of the
Church."

66

Aged 35-49 (13)
Number of Responses
Quesuon

(Q 9} Does the image of these rei igious
bUJidmgs (cathedrals} have an e!Tect on
\~hat one thmks about Catholicism or
Chnstian1ty in general?

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

4

8

I

"They have a good effect
on religiOn w1th fallh and
h1story, but, that also
depend on the person."
"No, atheists avoid
cathedrals."
"One thinks about faith "

Aged 50-64 (13)
Number of Responses
QuestiOn

(Q 9} Does the image of these religious
buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on
what one thinks about Catholicism or
Christianity m general?

YES

NO

No response/?

Notes

3

8

2

"That depends on the
person; this is a great
monument with fa1th as its
material."
"Yes, they make one
believe that relig1on is a
good thing, they are
mystical worl..s of an."
"Because of pnest
mvolved 10 pedophilia,
they g1ve a bad 1mage of
rehg1on "

Aged 65+ (8)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 9) Does the image of these religious
bUildings (cathedrals) have an effect on
\~hat one thinks about Catholicism or
Chris11an1ty 10 general?

YES

NO

No responsefl

Notes

3

4

I

"This is just a building that
does not have an effect on
belief. Belief IS m the
hean Beliefs are deep in
the hean "
"They are more mystical
w1th an amb1ance of
ntual "

67

Individual Questions
Aged 18-24 (SJ)
Number of Responses
Quesuon

(Q 2) Do you go to church?

(Q 3) Are you Catholic,
Protestant, other?

YES/Occasionally

NO/Rarely

Only to Fam1ly
Events

8/3

3513

3

Catholic

Protestant

Nothing/Atheist

Other

Comments

21

3

21

8

5 Muslims, I
Jehovah's
Witness. I
AgnostiC, I
CathfProt
As man)'
professmg
Catholics as
atheiSts

(Q 4) Do you consider
yourself a religious person?

YES

NO

8

45

(4 Catholics

( 18 Cath.,

I Muslim,

4 Muslims,

IJehovah 's,

I Cath/Prot)

One girl claimed
to be Protestant
and Catholic
because one parent
is Catholic and the
other Protestant
She says she IS not
religious because
of her educallon

2 Prot.)

Responses
(Q 8) What do the m8Jonty
of French or Orlcana1s !hint..
of religion?

23 are unsure or do not

8 thmk that the

know

French don't
think about
rei igion at all

4 believe relig1on is
not Important to the
majority;
I thinks the
Orleanais think
religion is boring;

5 believe religion is
a source of very
strong negative
feelings

II think that
adherents to
religions think a
lot about God,
have respect
toward religion

Others had d1v1ded
opinions"Christians thmt..
good thmgs about
religion, but
athe1sts think
about bad things
concerning
religion"

68

Aged 25-34 (13)

Number of Responses
Question

(Q 2) Do you go to church'~

(Q 3) Are you Catholic.
Protestant., other?

YES/Occasionally

NOfRarely

Only to Fam1l)
Events

3 Muslims go to the Mosque

112

712

I

Catholic

Protestant

Noth ing/Atheist

Other

6

0

3

I Chrisuan
(doesn' t cla1m
Prot Or Cath )

Comments

3 Muslims

(Q 4) Do you consider
yourself a rel igious person?

YES

NO

7

6

(all 3 Muslims said :res)
Responses
(Q 8) What do the majority
of French or Orlcanais think
of rel igion?

3 said that everyone has
their own opinions or
that it's a personal
thing.

2 said people
think of sects

2 said people maJ..e
fun of religion

4 said they d1dn 't
know
"One doesn't talk
about rellg10n It's
taboo."

I said religion is
for parents and
that fewer are
going to church"

69

Aged 35-49 ( 13)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 2) Do you go to
church?

(Q 3) Are you Catholic,
Protestant, other?

(Q 4) Do you consider
)'ourself a religious
person?

YES/Occasionally

NO/Rarely

Only to Family Events

2 Mushms; I went to the Mosque

1/0

10/1

I

Catholic

Protestant

Noth 10g/Atheist

Other

7

I

3

2 Muslims

YES

NO

2

II

(I Cath.

(I Muslim;

I Muslim)

6 Catholics;

Comments

I Prot)
Responses
(Q 8) What do the
majonty of French or
Orleanais think of
religion?

"A lot of young people
don 't th10l.. about relig1on
af\er communion; they
don't go to church
anymore."

"Everyone has
the1r own
beliefs"

"One doesn 't thmk
about religion a lot "

2 said, "One
doesn' t have
respect for
religion"

"EVCf)'bod) IS
very very full of
belief."

70

Aged 50-64 (13)

Number of Responses
Question

(Q 2) Do you go to church?

(Q 3) Aie you Catholic,
Protestant, other'?

(Q 4) Do you cons1der
yourself a religious person?

YES/Occasionally

NO/Rarely

Only to Family
Events

415

4/0

0

Catholic

Protestant

Nothing/Atheist

Other

8

3

I

I Christian
(doesn't clmm
Cath. Or Prot)

YES

NO

4

9

(3 Prot.

(all 8 Catholics
responded "No")

Comments

I Christian)
Responses
(Q 8) What do the majority
of French or Orleanais think
of rei igion?

3 said. "One thinks that
religion is the opium of
the people; when one
has difficulties, one
turns to religion"

One simply said
that the French
think about
religion.

One said, "Li ke the
majority of France,
one thinks that only
the minimum is
necessary with
religion Then one
forgets about
religion "

2 "Nobody talks
about religion."

2 "One docsn 't
think about
religion. And 1f
one docs, 11's not a
lot of good
thmgs."

71

Aged 65+ (8)
Number of Responses
Question

(Q 2) Do you go to church?

(Q 3) Are you Catholic,
Protestant, other"

(Q 4) Do you consider
yourself a rehg1ous person.,

YES/Occasionally

NO/Rarely

Only to Family
Events

5/1

2/0

0

Catholic

Protestant

Nothing/Atheist

Other

5

2

I

0

YES

NO

5

3

(3 Cath

(2 Cath)

Comments

Both (2) Prot.)
Responses
(Q 8) What do the majority
of French or Orleanais think
of religion?

"Religion doesn' t catch
people's attention"

"The French
think about
religion."

6 didn 't know.

72

GENERAL QUESTIONS
Aged 18-U (53)
Increasing

Declining

Stagnant

Don't Kno\~

4

33

8

5

(2 said Prot 10 par11cular
was increasmg)

(2 smd Cath. was in
decline)

Which ReligiOn

Atheism/Nonbelief/Nothing

Don't Know

Comments

(Q 7) Is there another system of

141slnm

30

9

belief that 's taking the place of
Christianity? If yes, what other
religions?

6 Buddhism

Most people \\ho said
"stagnant" sa1d they
didn "t know itlwhat other
religions were mcreasing.

(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is

mcreasing or decreasing?

4 sects
~Religion 10 general

is in

2 Juda1sm

decline."

I Scientology

"With immigration, one
can travel more easily
which leads to a nse of
other rellg1ons."
2 said, "People waste
time on religion. One has
other things to do."

Aged 25-34 (13)
lncreasmg

Declining

Stagnant

Don 't KnO\\

0

12

0

I

Wh ich Religion

Atheism/Nonbelief/Nothing

Don't Know

Comments

(Q 7) Is there another system of

5 Islam

10

2

belief that's taking the place of
Christianity? If yes, what other
religions?

I Buddhism

"Atheism IS rising
because of this
generation."

(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity

IS

mcreasing or decreasing?
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Aged 35-49 ( 13)
Increasmg

Declining

Stagnant

Don 't Know

2

4

3

4

( I Prot. increasing in
particular)

(I Cath. decreasing in
partiCUlar)

Which Rellg1on

Athe1sm!Nonbelief/Nothing

Don't Know

Comments

(Q 7) Is there another system of

8 Islam

6

I

belief that's taking the place of
Chnstianity? If yes, what other
rellg1ons?

3 sects

"Christianity is
increasing because of
cnscs"

(Q 6) Do you believe Chnstianity IS

mcreasing or decreasing?

2 Buddhism

"There is a rise m sects
that steal our money."

Aged SO-~ (13)
Increasi ng

Declming

Stagnant

Don' t Know

I

8

0

0

(3 Prot. increasmg in
pamcular)

(4 Cath. decreasing m
particular)

Which Religion

Atheism/NonbehefiNothing

Don 't Know

Comments

(Q 7) Is there another system of

81slam

5

5

belief that's taking the place of
Christianity? If yes, what other
rellg10ns?

3 Agnosticism

''There arc young people
who are begmning to
believe in God. There are
Christian associations for
young people .~

lncreasmg

Declining

Stagnant

Don't Know

I

5

0

2

Which Rellg1on

Athe1sm!Nonbelief/Nothing

Don't Know

Comments

(Q 7) Is there another system of

2 1slam

3

3

belief that 's taking the place of
Chnstianity? If yes. what other
rellg10ns?

2 said, "There arc fewer
practicmg Christians."

2 Buddh1sm

(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is
mcreasing or decreasmg?

Aged 65 + (8)

(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is
increasing or decreasing?

"There are a lot fewer
Protestants than
Catholics."

74
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